Difference between revisions of "Are Emotions Natural Kinds"
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* <section begin=title />[[Are Emotions Natural Kinds?]]<section end=title /> | * <section begin=title />[[Are Emotions Natural Kinds?]]<section end=title /> | ||
* <section begin=source />''Perspectives on Psychological Science'', 1, 28-58<section end=source /> | * <section begin=source />''Perspectives on Psychological Science'', 1, 28-58<section end=source /> | ||
* <section begin=abstract />Laypeople and scientists alike believe that they know anger, or sadness, or fear, when they see it. These emotions and a few others are presumed to have specific causal mechanisms in the brain and properties that are observable (on the face, in the voice, in the body, or in experience) – that is, they are assumed to be natural kinds. If a given emotion is a natural kind and can be identified objectively, then it is possible to make discoveries about emotion. Indeed, the scientific study of emotion is founded on this assumption. In this article, I review the accumulating empirical evidence that is inconsistent with the view that there are kinds of emotion with boundaries that are carved in nature. I then consider what moving beyond a natural-kind view might mean for the scientific understanding of emotion.<section begin=abstract /> | |||
* <section begin=response-qty />1<section end=response-qty /> | * <section begin=response-qty />1<section end=response-qty /> | ||
* <section begin=response-list />{{response-ref|response:2006-Alvarado(2006-Barratt)}}<section end=response-list /> | * <section begin=response-list />{{response-ref|response:2006-Alvarado(2006-Barratt)}}<section end=response-list /> | ||
Revision as of 02:03, 14 April 2007
- Barrett, L.F.
- 2006-09-23
- 2006
- Barrett 2006
- Are Emotions Natural Kinds?
- Perspectives on Psychological Science, 1, 28-58
- Laypeople and scientists alike believe that they know anger, or sadness, or fear, when they see it. These emotions and a few others are presumed to have specific causal mechanisms in the brain and properties that are observable (on the face, in the voice, in the body, or in experience) – that is, they are assumed to be natural kinds. If a given emotion is a natural kind and can be identified objectively, then it is possible to make discoveries about emotion. Indeed, the scientific study of emotion is founded on this assumption. In this article, I review the accumulating empirical evidence that is inconsistent with the view that there are kinds of emotion with boundaries that are carved in nature. I then consider what moving beyond a natural-kind view might mean for the scientific understanding of emotion.
- 1
- {{#lst:response:2006-Alvarado(2006-Barratt)|ref}} {{#lst:response:2006-Alvarado(2006-Barratt)|formats}}