Difference between revisions of "Are Emotions Natural Kinds"
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* <section begin=author />Barrett, L.F.<section end=author /> | * <section begin=author />Barrett, L.F.<section end=author /> | ||
* <section begin=year />2006<section end=year /> | * <section begin=year />2006<section end=year /> | ||
Revision as of 15:58, 10 September 2008
- Barrett, L.F.
- 2006
- Barrett 2006
- Are Emotions Natural Kinds?
- Perspectives on Psychological Science, 1, 28-58
- Laypeople and scientists alike believe that they know anger, or sadness, or fear, when they see it. These emotions and a few others are presumed to have specific causal mechanisms in the brain and properties that are observable (on the face, in the voice, in the body, or in experience) – that is, they are assumed to be natural kinds. If a given emotion is a natural kind and can be identified objectively, then it is possible to make discoveries about emotion. Indeed, the scientific study of emotion is founded on this assumption. In this article, I review the accumulating empirical evidence that is inconsistent with the view that there are kinds of emotion with boundaries that are carved in nature. I then consider what moving beyond a natural-kind view might mean for the scientific understanding of emotion.
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- {{#lst:response:2006-Alvarado.1|ref}} {{#lst:response:2006-Alvarado.1|formats}}