Difference between revisions of "Metacognition in the Rat"

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* <section begin=author />Foote, A. L., & Crystal, J. D.<section end=author />
[[keyname::2007-Foote]]
* <section begin=year />2007<section end=year />
[[author::Foote, A. L.]]
* <section begin=ref />[[Metacognition in the Rat|Foote/Crystal 2007]]<section end=ref />
[[author::Crystal, J. D.]]
* <section begin=title />[[Metacognition in the Rat]]<section end=title />
[[year::2007]]
* <section begin=source />''Current Biology'', 17, 551-555<section end=source />
[[cite/author::Foote/Crystal 2007]]
* <section begin=abstract />The ability to reflect on one's own mental processes, termed metacognition, is a defining feature of human existence. Consequently, a fundamental question in comparative cognition is whether nonhuman animals have knowledge of their own cognitive states. Recent evidence suggests that people and nonhuman primates but not less "cognitively sophisticated" species and are capable of metacognition. Here, we demonstrate for the first time that rats are capable of metacognition &ndash; i.e., they know when they do not know the answer in a duration-discrimination test. Before taking the duration test, rats were given the opportunity to decline the test. On other trials, they were not given the option to decline the test. Accurate performance on the duration test yielded a large reward, whereas inaccurate performance resulted in no reward. Declining a test yielded a small but guaranteed reward. If rats possess knowledge regarding whether they know the answer to the test, they would be expected to decline most frequently on difficult tests and show lowest accuracy on difficult tests that cannot be declined. Our data provide evidence for both predictions and suggest that a nonprimate has knowledge of its own cognitive state.<section end=abstract />
[[title::Metacognition in the Rat]]
* <section begin=response-qty />1<section end=response-qty />
[[published in::Current Biology]]
* <section begin=response-list />{{response-ref|Response:2007-Foote.1}}<section end=response-list />
[[cite/source::''Current Biology'', 17, 551-555]]
 
[[abstract::The ability to reflect on one's own mental processes, termed [[metacognition]], is a defining feature of human existence. Consequently, a fundamental question in comparative cognition is whether nonhuman animals have knowledge of their own cognitive states. Recent evidence suggests that people and nonhuman primates but not less "cognitively sophisticated" species and are capable of metacognition. Here, we demonstrate for the first time that rats are capable of metacognition &ndash; i.e., they know when they do not know the answer in a duration-discrimination test. Before taking the duration test, rats were given the opportunity to decline the test. On other trials, they were not given the option to decline the test. Accurate performance on the duration test yielded a large reward, whereas inaccurate performance resulted in no reward. Declining a test yielded a small but guaranteed reward. If rats possess knowledge regarding whether they know the answer to the test, they would be expected to decline most frequently on difficult tests and show lowest accuracy on difficult tests that cannot be declined. Our data provide evidence for both predictions and suggest that a nonprimate has knowledge of its own cognitive state.]]
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Latest revision as of 17:20, 25 July 2020


Metacognition in the Rat: Foote, A. L., Crystal, J. D. Current Biology, 17, 551-555 (2007).

Abstract

The ability to reflect on one's own mental processes, termed metacognition, is a defining feature of human existence. Consequently, a fundamental question in comparative cognition is whether nonhuman animals have knowledge of their own cognitive states. Recent evidence suggests that people and nonhuman primates but not less "cognitively sophisticated" species and are capable of metacognition. Here, we demonstrate for the first time that rats are capable of metacognition – i.e., they know when they do not know the answer in a duration-discrimination test. Before taking the duration test, rats were given the opportunity to decline the test. On other trials, they were not given the option to decline the test. Accurate performance on the duration test yielded a large reward, whereas inaccurate performance resulted in no reward. Declining a test yielded a small but guaranteed reward. If rats possess knowledge regarding whether they know the answer to the test, they would be expected to decline most frequently on difficult tests and show lowest accuracy on difficult tests that cannot be declined. Our data provide evidence for both predictions and suggest that a nonprimate has knowledge of its own cognitive state.

Responses

 Date"Date" is a type and predefined property provided by Semantic MediaWiki to represent date values.AuthorLead-in
Metacognition: A problem not a process15 March 2007J. E. R. Staddon
Jeremie Jozefowiez
Dan Cerutti		"Metacognition" in animals can be explained by familiar learning principles...
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Abstract
The ability to reflect on one's own mental … The ability to reflect on one's own mental processes, termed metacognition, is a defining feature of human existence. Consequently, a fundamental question in comparative cognition is whether nonhuman animals have knowledge of their own cognitive states. Recent evidence suggests that people and nonhuman primates but not less "cognitively sophisticated" species and are capable of metacognition. Here, we demonstrate for the first time that rats are capable of metacognition – i.e., they know when they do not know the answer in a duration-discrimination test. Before taking the duration test, rats were given the opportunity to decline the test. On other trials, they were not given the option to decline the test. Accurate performance on the duration test yielded a large reward, whereas inaccurate performance resulted in no reward. Declining a test yielded a small but guaranteed reward. If rats possess knowledge regarding whether they know the answer to the test, they would be expected to decline most frequently on difficult tests and show lowest accuracy on difficult tests that cannot be declined. Our data provide evidence for both predictions and suggest that a nonprimate has knowledge of its own cognitive state. has knowledge of its own cognitive state. +
Author
Foote, A. L. +  and Crystal, J. D. +
Cite/author
Foote/Crystal 2007 +
Cite/source
Current Biology, 17, 551-555 +
Format version
3.1 +
Keyname
2007-Foote +
Page type
Spec/target +
Published in
Current Biology +
Title
Metacognition in the Rat +
Year
2007 +