Difference between revisions of "Metacognition in the Rat"
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[[ | [[keyname::2007-Foote]] | ||
[[ | [[author::Foote, A. L.]] | ||
[[ | [[author::Crystal, J. D.]] | ||
[[ | [[year::2007]] | ||
[[cite/author::Foote/Crystal 2007]] | |||
[[title::Metacognition in the Rat]] | |||
[[published in::Current Biology]] | |||
[[cite/source::''Current Biology'', 17, 551-555]] | |||
[[abstract::The ability to reflect on one's own mental processes, termed [[metacognition]], is a defining feature of human existence. Consequently, a fundamental question in comparative cognition is whether nonhuman animals have knowledge of their own cognitive states. Recent evidence suggests that people and nonhuman primates but not less "cognitively sophisticated" species and are capable of metacognition. Here, we demonstrate for the first time that rats are capable of metacognition – i.e., they know when they do not know the answer in a duration-discrimination test. Before taking the duration test, rats were given the opportunity to decline the test. On other trials, they were not given the option to decline the test. Accurate performance on the duration test yielded a large reward, whereas inaccurate performance resulted in no reward. Declining a test yielded a small but guaranteed reward. If rats possess knowledge regarding whether they know the answer to the test, they would be expected to decline most frequently on difficult tests and show lowest accuracy on difficult tests that cannot be declined. Our data provide evidence for both predictions and suggest that a nonprimate has knowledge of its own cognitive state.]] | |||
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Latest revision as of 17:20, 25 July 2020
Metacognition in the Rat: Foote, A. L., Crystal, J. D. Current Biology, 17, 551-555 (2007).
Abstract
The ability to reflect on one's own mental processes, termed metacognition, is a defining feature of human existence. Consequently, a fundamental question in comparative cognition is whether nonhuman animals have knowledge of their own cognitive states. Recent evidence suggests that people and nonhuman primates but not less "cognitively sophisticated" species and are capable of metacognition. Here, we demonstrate for the first time that rats are capable of metacognition – i.e., they know when they do not know the answer in a duration-discrimination test. Before taking the duration test, rats were given the opportunity to decline the test. On other trials, they were not given the option to decline the test. Accurate performance on the duration test yielded a large reward, whereas inaccurate performance resulted in no reward. Declining a test yielded a small but guaranteed reward. If rats possess knowledge regarding whether they know the answer to the test, they would be expected to decline most frequently on difficult tests and show lowest accuracy on difficult tests that cannot be declined. Our data provide evidence for both predictions and suggest that a nonprimate has knowledge of its own cognitive state.
Responses
| Date"Date" is a type and predefined property provided by Semantic MediaWiki to represent date values. | Author | Lead-in | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Metacognition: A problem not a process | 15 March 2007 | J. E. R. Staddon Jeremie Jozefowiez Dan Cerutti | "Metacognition" in animals can be explained by familiar learning principles... |
... more about "Metacognition in the Rat"
The ability to reflect on one's own mental … The ability to reflect on one's own mental processes, termed metacognition, is a defining feature of human existence. Consequently, a fundamental question in comparative cognition is whether nonhuman animals have knowledge of their own cognitive states. Recent evidence suggests that people and nonhuman primates but not less "cognitively sophisticated" species and are capable of metacognition. Here, we demonstrate for the first time that rats are capable of metacognition – i.e., they know when they do not know the answer in a duration-discrimination test. Before taking the duration test, rats were given the opportunity to decline the test. On other trials, they were not given the option to decline the test. Accurate performance on the duration test yielded a large reward, whereas inaccurate performance resulted in no reward. Declining a test yielded a small but guaranteed reward. If rats possess knowledge regarding whether they know the answer to the test, they would be expected to decline most frequently on difficult tests and show lowest accuracy on difficult tests that cannot be declined. Our data provide evidence for both predictions and suggest that a nonprimate has knowledge of its own cognitive state. has knowledge of its own cognitive state. +
Foote/Crystal 2007 +
Current Biology, 17, 551-555 +